Hanazawa said:
Uhm...A few points here.
i) They attacked a convoy of Scimitar CVRTs/light tanks. Those are pretty much exclusively used by British armed forces. There is very little that the hostile forces in iraq would be using that would look anything like them.
ii) All military forces (especially those who fly close air support/Tank buster aircraft like the A-10) are supposed to receive target identification training. They were displaying their marker panels (the orange things they mention 5-6 times in the video/transcript) which are implicitly required to help avoid air to ground blue on blue incidents like this. Sure, they potentially COULD have been faked, but so could ANY kind of identification system. It's there to act as an extra layer of recognising friendly forces, that's all. Other forms of doing so are still more important.Which they obviously failed at (thinking they were ZIL 157s according to the transcript.)
Scimitar
ZIL 157
iii) The british forces were not provided with US IFF electronic recognition devices, which is likely where the whole "no friendlies in the area" came from. That, or it was yet another in a series of miscommunicational misunderstandings.
iv) Not having a positive ID on your target means you don't engage. It's one of the most basic rules to follow if you are in a situation where you are not under direct fire. Even the A-10 Pilot operational procedures makes this clear.
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/11oa10v3.pdf said:
*6.5.3.3. Pilots will not expend ordnance if any doubt exists as to the ground personnel or intended target locations.
They still did not have a positive ID when they went on their second run.
v) The British troops' calls for ceasefire were ignored/not heard after the first pass until during/after the second attack run.
vi) potential MAJOR communication issues between the FACs and pilots. The FAC (Manilla Hotel) may have been thinking they were engaging the vehicles in the "revetts" as opposed to the convoy.
1343.13 MANILA HOTEL:
POPOV 36 from MANILA HOTEL, guns . . .
1343.17 MANILA HOTEL:
To engage those targets in the revetts (slopes).
Which came after the first attack run.
Not that I particularly blame the pilots completely. They were obviously distraught over it. It's a large fault of communication breakdown between the FACs and the pilots. The whole thing is a huge mess.
they were happy that they killed what they though they killed iraqis or whatever yet disgusted when they killed their own?
One tends to feel more remorse for killing a comrade than someone on the other side. Especially in something that relies on comradery as the military. Be surprised as you want, it's the truth.
ps: The video probably needs IE.