Whoa, I've been gone 4 hours and nobody has made a post.. is that a record?
It might be. Let's fix that with episode two of
Delta V. Yesterday, we looked at the Soviet answer to the Supersonic Transport (SST) in the Tupolev Tu-144. The SST competition was always a political standoff, with both sides of the iron curtain itching to be the leaders in what was promising to be the new face of commercial aviation. And of course, the Americans wanted a slice of the supersonic pie. This was the chance for the capitalist world to flex their engineering might against the communist regime, after all. Congress was interested, as were several companies like Lockheed and Convair. And with the combination of government backing and the engineering might that comes behind a name like Boeing, it was all but guaranteed to be a resounding success.
So why haven’t we heard of the Boeing 2707?
Well, it’s a story of intrigue, bureaucracy, ambition, and testing on unsuspecting civilians. Let’s look back to where it all began in 1952.
The full-scale Boeing 2707-100 mockup - current whereabouts or status unknown
Post World War 2 America was a land of both unbridled optimism and fear. Both the Eastern and Western blocs were out to prove the superiority of their respective regimes, and everyone got busy stocking nukes as the arms race raged on (and managing to lose a few nukes on the way). New methods of delivery and deterrence were in development each day, from ICBMs, to jets, to computers, to lasers. The list goes on and on.
But whatever development went into potential wartime instruments also came out in civilian technology. ICBMs preceded Sputnik and Apollo, while jets born out of WWII began propelling passengers across the globe in record time. All manners of electronics began shrinking as transistors gave rise to new digital computers. And since Chuck Yeager’s landmark flight in 1947, planes like the Avro Arrow, Saab Draken, and MiG-25 began to push performance boundaries. These planes were all built with a common goal – to respond to a threat as soon as possible, pushing past Mach 2 to do so.
Saturn V, the pinnacle of the 1960s aerospace tech race
And it’s in this context we saw the origins of the Boeing 2707. In 1952, Boeing, like other manufacturers, began to ponder the idea of using supersonic technology in a civilian application. It would be random sparks of passing interest here and there, with small studies culminating in the formation of a formal research committee in 1958. But it wasn’t until the announcement of the Concorde and the Tu-144 that America finally took a serious interest.
If we recall origins of the Airbus A300, it struggled to compete in a market dominated by US manufacturers. And those manufacturers that supplied 80% of the world’s aircraft didn’t like their market dominance being threatened. If they wanted to stay on top as kings of commercial aviation, they couldn’t lose. Even if it was to the friendly bloc. A few days after the Concorde was formally announced, FAA director Najeeb Halaby wrote to President Kennedy outlining the state of the competition, and what would happen if the Concorde were allowed to win.
Mr. Halaby painted a very dire picture for the American aviation industry if the Europeans got a head start on the SST market; Up to $3 Bn USD lost in exports, up to $4 Bn lost in potential income, and 50,000 jobs cut. Oh, and the US would “relinquish world civil transport leadership.” It wasn’t an entirely baseless fear (though perhaps blown a
smidge out of proportion), since carriers like Pan Am and TWA were already showing interest. JFK took note, and in 1963, he announced the National Supersonic Transport Program.
The process for SST selection went out similar to any other contract bid. The FAA outlined in 1963 their expectations for an SST to rival the Concorde. And in typical American fashion, it had to be bigger and better in every way. Proposed designs had to be Mach 3 capable (vs the Concorde’s Mach 2), seat 227 (vs the Concorde’s 128), and be economically viable to replace subsonic medium range aircraft (vs the Concorde’s habit of burning money for fun).
The SST runner up, the Lockheed L-2000
Other manufacturers had already sketched designs prior to the announcement of the contract bid including Douglas and Convair. But after seeing the requirements, both determined that there was no way they could engineer a better Concorde from scratch before the Concorde was scheduled to enter service. But swayed by that sweet government money, Boeing, Lockheed, and North American Aviation submitted their proposals.
Even before a design was selected, airlines were already lining up for orders. The FAA had made lofty predictions that the winner would have a market for 500 SSTs by 1990, and it certainly seemed like the next logical progression after the leap from propellers to jets. The Lockheed CL-823 (later the Lockheed L-2000) was the more traditional offering, basically being the American version of the Tu-144 in that it copied the look of the Concorde to a suspicious degree. NAA’s NAC-60, meanwhile, was actually just a scaled up XB-70 Valkyrie.
But Boeing’s design was unique. It featured variable geometry wings (or swing wings), with outer segments that could sweep forwards or backwards to help the aircraft maintain control at both low and high speeds and tail mounted engines to help keep heat away from the plane itself. Boeing’s “Project 733” would ultimately win the competition, after the NAA entry failed to meet Mach 3, and the Lockheed was eliminated after several more stages of a tight competition that saw full scale mockups being built and high capacity variants sketched out from both competitors.
The Boeing 733 would’ve been advanced enough on its own even if it never broke the speed of sound. Of course, the swing wings were unheard of in commercial aviation, and it featured one of the earliest glass cockpits (fully digital instrumentation) ever made or conceptualized. It was even the first widebody proposal by Boeing, preceding their own 747. It even featured retractable TVs for every six rows – a necessity since the plane’s windows were only 6 inches across, which is about the size of an average <Redacted>. After winning the proposal in 1966, Boeing had promised that prototype construction would start by early 1967. They also said that it would start regular production in 1969, make first flight in 1970, and be certified by 1974. And they said they’d need to make the fuselage out of titanium instead of regular aluminum due to the heat generated by friction with the air, which if you’re paying attention, was a lot of Boeing just saying things because they sounded nice.
Artist's rendition of Project 733 - note the variable wing positions
Boeing’s target of being production ready in under a decade was lofty. Even their regular aircraft were taking about the same amount of time to develop. So when Boeing finally stopped talking about all the unicorn tears they’d be delivering, they found themselves looking at an engineering nightmare. For starters, titanium is an incredibly difficult material to work with and heavier than traditional aircraft aluminum, not to mention expensive. And Boeing had asserted that they needed the entire fuselage to be made of the stuff. But more importantly, the swing wing that Boeing wanted to build was far too heavy for the airframe, meaning they had to add an extra central landing gear bogey just to support the rear-concentrated weight.