You know what? This seems slow enough.
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In the early dawn of 2005, five thousand people gathered in a dark room in Toulouse, France, to watch the show of a lifetime. The guests watched as a choreographed, Cirque-du-Soleil style performance played out before them, telling a wordless tale of unity, cooperation, and ambition. As the show drew to a close, a group of children were brought on stage to pull on a rope, sending the curtains to the ground and revealing the behemoth waiting in the hangar behind it. It was a dramatic reveal, packed with symbology for what was surely going to be the most significant aircraft of the century – the mighty Airbus A380.
The January 18, 2005 unveiling of the A380
January 18 was a jubilant day, and it’s easy to see why everyone was so proud. At 575 seats, it eclipsed the decades-old Boeing 747, long unchallenged as the largest airliner ever built. And with modern underpinnings from the company that gave the world the Concorde, it seemed like the perfect tool to strike at the 747’s thirty-six-year reign as the Queen of the Skies.
But over in Seattle, Boeing was putting the finishing touches on the 747-8, featuring the first (and only) fuselage stretch in the aircraft’s history, as well as a host of updates to the engines and avionics. But it wasn’t Boeing’s main focus – far from it. The new 777-300ER was pushing the type’s sales into the thousands, and the new ultra-advanced 787 Dreamliner was about to hit the market. By the time the 747-8 was certified, they’d estimated that the market wouldn’t even be strong enough to sell 300 examples. And Boeing launched the 747-8 in 2011 fully knowing it would be the last.
So…who exactly did Airbus build the A380 for?
Let’s start with a trip back in time; back to a company that once challenged Boeing on home turf, and back to a decade that gave us Miami Vice, neon, jorts, and carpeted bathrooms. Welcome to part two of
Double Decker.
It’s safe to say that the 747 left a rather significant impact on the aviation world. It took the world by storm, and competing manufacturers were scrambling to fill the void between the largest airliner in the world and everything else. We saw the brief rise of the trijet widebody, as Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas fought for a niche that Airbus promptly took over.
When the dust settled and everyone realized the trijet was a dead end, McDonnell-Douglas wanted to fight back. The problem was, their DC-10 had left them with serious damage to their reputation, and they didn’t have the money to go toe to toe with Boeing. In their final throes, they pushed out the MD-11, itself a warmed-over DC-10 without as many glaring safety issues. But they had a secret plan – push the MD-11, make some money back, and start on a new double decker project called the MD-12 by 1988 that would make the 747 look like child’s play.
Render of the MD-12 study
This didn’t go anywhere.
By the time the proposal was made public in 1991, McDonnell-Douglas was in severe financial trouble. The MD-11 was unable to shake the publicity blow of the DC-10, nor was it able to cater to an increasingly economy-minded market. And by the end of the decade, Boeing would absorb the company. But before they went, Douglas made an offer to Airbus Industrie to sell them the plans for the MD-12.
This also didn’t go anywhere. And in 1997, the merger was finalized and Boeing put an end to McDonnell-Douglas’ shenanigans. But the design did leave an impression on the burgeoning European giant. In 1988, Airbus was already looking at a slice of the jumbo pie, watching the 747 from the sidelines. Remember how Airbus started? They’re a company never content to just watch. They wanted what Boeing was having. And like the A300 was to the L-1011 and DC-10, it would be better in every way. So Airbus sent out a call to its subsidiary companies, tabling the best designs from Aerospatiale, BAE, Deutsch Aerospace, CASA, and…Boeing?
Yes, Boeing was in the mix to help develop a competitor for the 747. Though the way Boeing saw it, the joint effort would simply give the 747 a successor. And Boeing had a concept ready, creatively called the New Large Aircraft. It was, frankly, a double decker like the MD-12 and eventual A380, because designing in a single direction will invariably yield the most efficient design.
Fast forwarding to today, the 747 is expected to end production in 2022 with no direct successor. This isn’t because Boeing didn’t have the know-how or space. Instead, when Boeing polled airlines about the NLA project, they only got interest from a whopping two customers. It seemed like a colossal waste of $15 Bn USD, so Boeing decided to pack it in and focus on the 777. Between all my sources, I can’t exactly say why Airbus decided to continue. Boeing had seen the writing on the wall, and they knew from the beginning whatever variant or successor of the 747 wasn’t what the market wanted. But Airbus would forge ahead on this project alone, forming their Large Aircraft Division in 1996, and launching the A3XX program at the turn of the millennium.
The A380 assembly in Toulouse, France
By 2002, Airbus had begun manufacturing the nearly 4 million different components that made up the first A380. Buoyed by financial backing from the German, French, and British governments, Airbus proceeded to blow straight through their €9.5M estimate. In fact, if you were to sum up the A380 development experience, “delayed” and “over budget” would be the most accurate descriptors. Not that the 747 was a beacon of fiscal sense, but development seemed to be defined more by what wasn’t happening, which is to say construction and certification.
The final budget would balloon to about €20 Bn, and it would be the subject of some good old-fashioned political controversy. The World Trade Organization went after the European Union on the grounds that it was illegally propping up Airbus with state subsidies. It was a seven-year battle for the WTO, and it was just one of several indicators that Airbus should’ve cut their losses and moved on. Instead, the project would soldier on despite witnessing several financial crashes, including the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 recession, both diminishing the hopes of finding buyers.
Breakdown of major components and origins
Development wasn’t honestly faring much better. There are countless systems that need to work in tandem for any modern airliner. For example, in order to supply a plane the size of the A380, you need a
lot of wiring. Or more specifically, about 530 km. This is enough of a challenge on its own, and it’s even worse when you have multiple competing standards. Despite pulling together for the A300 decades ago, the Germans and the Spanish couldn't effectively communicate because they weren’t even using the same software as the French. It was an organizational effort charitably described as a clusterf*ck. A six month delay in 2005 would become a thirteen month delay. And it would spiral onwards from there.
